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Abstract 
A hierarchical taxonomy of psychopathology aims to replace traditional disorder categories 
with a hierarchy of increasingly general dimensions that arise from the statistical covariation 
among symptoms. However, the ontogeny and ontology of these dimensions remain 
contentious. We analyzed two large longitudinal datasets to examine developmental changes 
in two dimensions of psychopathology, at two distinct levels of the hierarchical taxonomy, at 
two distinct developmental periods: the p-factor from early to late adolescence and major 
depressive disorder from middle adulthood to old age. We used latent change score models to 
directly compare the ability of two long-standing theories—the common cause theory and the 
dynamic mutualism theory—to explain the development of the two dimensions of 
psychopathology. A dynamic mutualism model best explained the development of the p-
factor, while both models provided equally good explanations for the development of major 
depressive disorder. But neither model could provide a sufficient explanation for the 
development of either dimension. We show that computational models offer a promising tool 
to improve mechanistic theories of psychopathology and suggest that progress may lie at the 
interface between multiple causes. 
Keywords: mutualism; p-factor; depression; longitudinal modeling; hierarchical taxonomy; 
nosology 
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Modeling and Ontology of Quantitative Dimensions of Psychopathology 
 Concern with the utility of traditional classification has inspired a data-driven 
movement that aims to reinvent psychiatric taxa. Proponents of this movement use factor 
analysis to describe empirical patterns of covariation among symptoms of psychopathology 
(Caspi et al., 2014; Kotov et al., 2017; Lahey et al., 2012; Lahey, Krueger, Rathouz, 
Waldman, & Zald, 2017). This results in a hierarchy of increasingly general dimensional 
entities (e.g. hierarchical taxonomy of psychopathology; Kotov et al., 2017). The most 
general of which, termed the p-factor due to its conceptual resemblance to the g-factor of 
intelligence, reflects variance shared by any and all types of mental illness (Caspi et al., 2014; 
Caspi & Moffitt, 2018). 
 Hierarchical factor models have been consistently shown to describe the pattern of 
symptom covariation well, ‘but the statistical models are agnostic about—and certainly do 
not reveal—the causes of these correlations’ (Caspi & Moffitt, 2018, p.3). There are multiple 
plausible data-generating mechanisms, and multiple models can statistically describe the 
positive covariation among symptoms, known as the positive manifold, equally well (Kruis & 
Maris, 2016; Marsman, Maris, Bechger, & Glas, 2015; van Bork, Epskamp, Rhemtulla, 
Borsboom, & van der Maas, 2017; Van Der Maas et al., 2006). This limits a purely data-
driven search for the data-generating mechanism and supports the importance of substantive 
theory. Theories make distinct predictions about the mechanisms that drive the development 
of the positive manifold in psychopathology, and innovations in structural equation modeling 
(McArdle, Hamagami, Meredith, & Bradway, 2000; McArdle & Hamagami, 2001) make it 
possible to formalize these mechanisms and directly compare them. This allows for an 
unprecedented comparison of long-standing theoretical mechanisms that vie to be the 
foundational framework for psychiatric classification and opens an inroad to the ontology of 
mental disorders. 
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 The present paper aims to advance knowledge on how to best model and understand 
the positive manifold in psychopathology. We limit the conceptual space to two theories that 
have garnered significant traction in recent literature to investigate which theory provides the 
most accurate explanation for the development of the positive manifold in 
psychopathology—the common cause theory or the dynamic mutualism theory? Each theory 
will be translated into a statistical model using different latent change score models (McArdle 
& Hamagami, 2001), and these models will be directly compared. To our knowledge, no 
study to date has directly compared common cause theory with dynamic mutualism theory, 
within the context of psychopathology. In the succeeding sections, we present the two 
theories and their corresponding models. We examine previous attempts to distinguish these 
developmental accounts and present our work that aims to further existing knowledge. 
Common cause theory 
 The common cause theory posits that symptoms within, but also across, traditional 
syndromes covary because they share a singular common cause (p-factor), on top of more 
specific causes shared by subsets of syndromes such as the internalizing and externalizing 
spectra (Caspi & Moffitt, 2018). The theory that symptoms covary because they share a 
common cause is a plausible candidate that represents the status quo when inferring the cause 
of traditional syndromes (e.g. Insel & Cuthbert, 2015; Reise & Waller, 2009). A common 
cause interpretation does not follow as a mathematical necessity from the models used to 
construct the hierarchical taxonomy (Jonas & Markon, 2016). But some have argued that it is 
the only defensible interpretation because common factor models treat variance that is not 
shared by a latent variable’s items as error (Van Bork, Wijsen, & Rhemtulla, 2017).  
 The use of a common factor model when a different model is appropriate carries 
substantial implications. First, the misuse of factor models can lead to inappropriate 
inferences made from structural equation models (Rhemtulla, van Bork, & Borsboom, 2019). 
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Take the case where we want to measure the relationship between depression and academic 
performance (AP), using a factor model with sleeplessness as an indicator of depression. This 
relationship would be overestimated because the unique relationship between sleeplessness 
and AP would be wrongly attributed to the relationship between AP and depression. Second, 
if all symptoms used to measure a common factor are not interchangeable indicators of their 
root cause, then studies using different items may not assess the same construct (Watts, 
Poore, & Waldman, 2019). Third, a common factor that does not reflect a common cause is a 
vacuous construct, in the sense that the position on the latent variable is not informative of 
the process that led to the person’s response (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & Van Heerden, 
2003). Vacuous common factors provide limited insight into mechanisms that can be targeted 
to improve treatment (Aristodemou & Fried, in press). Hence, research that aims to explain 
the development of psychopathology using hierarchical factor models, seems to implicitly 
assume that dimensions within the hierarchy are made up of congeneric items. 
Dynamic mutualism theory 
 The dynamic mutualism theory offers a plausible alternative by proposing that the 
positive manifold arises through dynamic processes that occur throughout development (Van 
Der Maas et al., 2006). This theory originates from research on human intelligence where 
empirical evidence strongly suggests that mutualistic coupling between different cognitive 
domains forms an essential developmental mechanism (Kievit, Hofman, & Nation, 2019; 
Kievit et al., 2017). 
 Within the domain of psychopathology, dynamic mutualism theory explains the 
development of the positive manifold by stating that symptoms covary because they cause 
each other (network theory; Borsboom, 2008; Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; Cramer, Waldorp, 
Van der Maas, & Borsboom, 2010; Borsboom, 2017; Fried et al., 2017; Mcnally, 2016). 
Some have argued that network theory is incompatible with a common cause interpretation 
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because no singular causal mechanism can explain the coherence of symptoms within a 
network (Borsboom, Cramer, & Kalis, 2019). Moreover, network theory embraces the 
assumption that multiple causes can lead to the manifestation of a symptom ( i.e. multiple 
realizability; Fodor, 1974; Horgan, 1993; Putnam, 1967; Pylyshyn, 1984). If these assertions 
hold, faulty categories and limited technology may not be at fault for our disappointing track 
record in identifying disorder-specific etiology (Borsboom et al., 2019). Instead, we should 
blame the monocausal model. 
 The network perspective does not only inspire skepticism about the common cause 
theory but also offers a methodological tool to study mental disorders as complex systems of 
causally active symptoms (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013). Potentially meaningful causal 
interrelations can be formalized using network models (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; 
Epskamp, Borsboom, & Fried, 2018; Epskamp & Fried, 2018; Fried & Cramer, 2017). This 
works by controlling for the shared variance among a set of symptoms, to estimate a 
weighted network of unique associations that represent possible causal associations 
(Epskamp & Fried, 2018). The substantive meaning of these empirical associations, however, 
depends on the contentious ontology of mental disorders. 
Common cause theory versus dynamic mutualism theory 
 At present we do not know which theory is (more) correct, and this harbors 
uncertainty about the best direction for clinical psychology and psychiatry. Common factor 
models and network models can offer equivalent descriptions of data (Kruis & Maris, 2016; 
Marsman et al., 2015), but their respective theories make different predictions about dynamic 
behavior that can be exploited using longitudinal data. However, only a few studies have 
compared common cause theory and dynamic mutualism theory within a longitudinal 
context, and none found preferential evidence for either theory (Greene & Eaton, 2017; 
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McElroy, Belsky, Carragher, Fearon, & Patalay, 2018; Murray, Eisner, & Ribeaud, 2016; 
Snyder, Young, & Hankin, 2017). 
 We commend the authors for their efforts but given the complexity of the topic, 
several challenges point to the merit of further investigation. First, one study specified 
hypotheses that may only be congruent with either theory if all other developmental 
processes are held equal (Murray et al., 2016). For instance, the authors hypothesized that 
dynamic mutualism theory predicts increasing symptom covariation over time because 
symptoms interact in a mutually reinforcing manner. But mutually reinforcing symptom 
interactions may co-occur with other developmental processes that lead to increasingly 
specific mental illness (McElroy et al., 2018). Hence, the validity of the dynamic mutualism 
theory does not necessitate increasing symptom covariation. Second, two studies relied on 
two waves with limited temporal coverage (i.e. 18-24 months; Greene & Eaton, 2017; 
Snyder, Young, & Hankin, 2017). Third, one study sampled from a wide age-range that 
covers divergent life periods (Greene & Eaton, 2017), which may be associated with different 
developmental mechanisms (Kievit et al., 2017). Fourth, a different study used cross-lagged 
panel models (McElroy et al., 2018) which are not well-suited to examine change (Kievit et 
al., 2017); and relied on maternal reports that are not well aligned with children’s responses 
once they are able to self-report (Waters, Steward-Brown, & Fitzpatrick, 2003). Lastly, and 
most importantly, none of the abovementioned studies has directly compared the two 
developmental mechanisms. 
 We aim to supplement past efforts by conducting a direct comparison between 
common cause theory and dynamic mutualism theory to find out which provides the most 
accurate account for the development of the positive manifold in psychopathology. We 
translate fundamental predictions made by each theory into latent change-score models 
(Kievit et al., 2018; McArdle, Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami, & Woodcock, 2002; McArdle & 
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Hamagami, 2001) that are well-suited to study temporal dynamics and allow us to directly 
compare the two theories. We further extend prior work by comparing the two theoretical 
accounts at two distinct levels of the hierarchical taxonomy, at two distinct developmental 
periods, using two distinct longitudinal datasets. We have two main research questions, each 
corresponding to a different dataset: 
(1) Which theory provides the most accurate account for the development of the positive 
manifold among dimensions that constitute the p-factor from early to late adolescence—
common cause theory or dynamic mutualism theory? 
(2) Which theory provides the most accurate account for the development of the positive 
manifold among symptoms that constitute major depressive disorder from middle 
adulthood to old age—common cause theory or dynamic mutualism theory? 
Method 
Dataset 1: z-proso 
Participants. The sample was obtained from the Zurich Project on the Social Development 
of Children and Youths (z-proso). The z-proso is a longitudinal cohort and intervention study 
with a focus on the development of adaptive and maladaptive social behaviors. However, the 
data are treated as observational since early interventions had no substantial effects on 
children ( e.g. Averdijk, Zirk-Sadowski, Ribeaud, & Eisner, 2016; Malti, Ribeaud, & Eisner, 
2011). The study population consists of all children that started in the first grade of primary 
school in the academic year of 2004/5, in Zurich. The target sample was chosen using a 
stratified random sampling procedure that considered school size and location. This consists 
of 1675 children from 56 public primary schools. In the present study, we will assess data 
from the four most recent measurement waves collected to date. This includes data from 
1,482 children and composes 88 percent of the original target sample. The median age of 
children at each wave is approximately 13, 15, 17, and 20 years. The gender ratio is roughly 
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equal (51% male) and the sample is ethnically diverse, with the Swiss majority constituting 
only 38.4% of the sample. Approximately 11 percent of the data in the study sample is 
missing and assumed to be missing at random. More detailed information regarding data 
collection and sample characteristics can be found on the z-proso website 
(https://www.jacobscenter.uzh.ch/en/research/zproso/aboutus/inst_erheb.html). 
Measures. Psychopathology symptoms were measured using an adaption of the self-report 
version of the Social Behavior Questionnaire (SBQ; Tremblay et al., 1991), which was 
administered in paper-and-pencil format. The z-proso version includes the addition of several 
items to enhance the measurement of psychopathology and sustain developmental pertinence 
as children move through different life periods. Moreover, the original 3-point scale was 
converted to a 5-point Likert scale (Never to Very often) and the questionnaire was 
administered in German. Prior psychometric analyses have ‘generally supported the factorial 
validity, criterion validity, and reliability of the SBQ items’ (Murray, Obsuth, Eisner, & 
Ribeaud, 2017, p.3). In the current study, we examined 42 items measured throughout four 
waves. This includes all SBQ items that have been recorded within the first three waves (age 
13-17), which assess the constructs of prosociality, aggression, oppositionality, depression, 
anxiety, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. In the final wave (age 20), an additional 
19 items were included to assess the constructs of anger and psychotic experiences. All 
measured domains refer to the frequency of the behavior in the past year, except for anxiety 
and depression items which refer to the frequency in the last month. We made two omissions 
to ensure comparability of item content across waves. First, items that are unique to the final 
wave (age 20) were excluded from our analyses. Second, four out of five self-report waves 
were analyzed because the first wave (age 11) measured fewer items (32 out of 42) than the 
succeeding waves. Lastly, prosociality items were recoded so that higher scores indicate 
lower levels of prosociality. 
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Statistical analyses (dataset 1: z-proso) 
 The following segment describes the specification, estimation, and assessment of the 
structural equation models used to compare the common cause theory with the dynamic 
mutualism theory. First, we describe the specification of the measurement models, followed 
by the specification of the structural models for each theory. Thereafter, we report our choice 
of estimator and the fit indices used to assess and compare models. To end we describe how 
we tested for measurement invariance. 
Measurement models. The hierarchical structure of psychopathology, which includes a 
causal p-factor, is modeled in two ways. The first is the bifactor model, which structures 
psychopathology using a general factor (p-factor) and multiple (usually orthogonal) specific 
factors (Caspi et al., 2014; Lahey et al., 2012). The p-factor explains most of the variance in 
symptoms of psychopathology, while the residual variance is explained by a set of specific 
factors. The second is the higher-order factor model, which structures psychopathology 
through a general factor that arises from the correlations among its subordinate dimensions 
(e.g. internalizing and externalizing factors). In other words, the p-factor in a higher-order 
factor model explains the covariance between its subordinate dimensions (Markon, 2019). 
 We examined the developmental p-factor that arises from a higher-order factor model. 
Our rationale is based on theoretical and psychometric concerns about bifactor models 
(Bonifay, Lane, & Reise, 2017; Greene et al., 2019; Morgan, Hodge, Wells, & Watkins, 
2015; Watts et al., 2019) and practical limitations (see Supplement 1, Appendix C). 
Exploratory factor analysis. We used an exploratory process to estimate the measurement 
models. First, we selected four first-order factors (internalizing, externalizing/aggression, 
pro-sociality, ADHD) based on previous work (Murray et al., 2016, 2017) and conceptual 
interpretability. Second, to determine the item content of each of the four factors we used 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on each wave and chose the most replicable solution. EFA 
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was conducted using the psych package in R (Revelle, 2019) and factors were extracted using 
minimal residual extraction with oblique rotation. Framing our measurement models as 
exploratory was deemed most defensible because prior exploratory work on the factor 
structure of the SBQ, albeit targeting different measurement waves, has already been 
published using the z-proso data (e.g. Murray et al., 2016). 
Confirmatory factor analysis. All analyses were conducted using the lavaan package in R 
(Rosseel, 2012). The four specific factors, estimated through the preceding EFA, were used 
to specify the confirmatory factor models. First, for the common cause model, confirmatory 
factor models were estimated at each time point. These models incorporate a five-factor 
structure composed of four, mutually correlated, first-order factors (internalizing, 
externalizing/aggression, prosociality, ADHD) and a second-order factor (p-factor). The 
second-order factor is a summary of the variance shared by the four first-order factors. 
Second, confirmatory factor models for the dynamic mutualism model were estimated at each 
time point. These models are composed of four, mutually correlated, first-order factors 
(internalizing, externalizing/aggression, pro-sociality, ADHD). 
Structural models. To compare competing theoretical mechanisms, we specified different 
latent change score (LCS) models (Kievit et al., 2018; McArdle & Hamagami, 2001; 
McArdle et al., 2000). The key notion in LCS models is that we can use successive 
differences between measures to calculate change scores. If we have a basic autoregression 
(1), where the scores of person i, for construct y, at time t are a function of an autoregressive 
component and some residual ζ. 
yi,t = βt,t-1yt-1,i + ζt,i  (1) 
Setting the regression slope (βt,t-1) to equal 1 (2), allowed us to conceptualize the residual as 
the difference between yt,i and yt-1,i (3), representing the change score Δyt,i (4). 
yti = (1)yt-1,i + ζt,i (2) 
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ζt,i = yt,i - yt-1,i  (3) 
Δyt,i = yt,i - yt-1,i                  (4) 
We then defined a latent change score factor Δηt,i, with a factor loading equal to 1, which 
allowed us to measure change between two time-points. Thereafter, we added a regression 
parameter to the latent change score factor to estimate how much of the change is due to 
scores at the previous time point (self-feedback process (β)). Since we are interested in the 
average change at each time point, we estimated the mean of the difference factor. The 
variance in the change factor was also estimated, representing how much individuals differ in 
their change score across time points. Next, we extended the univariate LCS model to a 
multivariate latent change score model. This gave us the ability to model change scores in 
multiple domains (McArdle et al., 2002). Change scores in a multivariate LCS model are 
modeled as the product of two parameters (5): a self-feedback process (β) and a coupling 
parameter (γ), with the latter capturing the extent to which change in one domain Δy1 at time 
t, is dependent on the score of another domain y2 at the preceding time point t-1. 
Δyt,i = β1y1t-1,i + γ1y2t-1,i (5) 
Common cause model. We conceptualized symptom scores as a function of the p-factor 
score at each time point (Figure 1a). The p-factor influences its own change through a self-
feedback parameter (β). We estimated the mean and variance of the latent change score factor 
at each time point. While the mean and variance of the general factor were estimated at time 
1 and equality constrained over time. We allowed residual terms to covary between time 
points for each observed variable with itself, to allow indicator specific variance (Kievit et 
al., 2017). Lastly, we imposed measurement invariance over time. 
Dynamic mutualism model. In this model, there is no common factor that causes the 
covariation among the four first-order factors. Instead, the first-order factors influence each 
other’s change (Figure 1b). Higher scores in domain y1 lead to greater changes in domain y2, 
MODELING AND ONTOLOGY OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 13 
 
and vice versa. This relationship was modeled for all domains via the use of coupling 
parameters (γ). Moreover, each domain was allowed to influence its own change via a self-
feedback process (β). All four domains could correlate at time 1. Additionally, to allow 
indicator specific variance, we allowed residual terms to covary between time points for each 
observed variable with itself (Kievit et al., 2017). We estimated the mean and variance of the 
latent change score factors at each time point. The mean and variance of the four latent 
domains were estimated at time 1 and equality constrained over time. Latent change factors 
were allowed to correlate within and between time points, portraying the relationship 
between them after any possible coupling effects. Lastly, we imposed measurement 
invariance over time. 
Model fit and comparison. All models were estimated using the lavaan package in R 
(Rosseel, 2012). Full information maximum likelihood with robust standard errors was used 
to deal with missingness and nonnormality. We relied on the following indices for the 
assessment of overall model fit: the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA; 
acceptable fit: < .08, good fit: < .05), the comparative fit index (CFI; acceptable fit: .95-97, 
good fit: >.97), and the standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR; acceptable fit: .05-
.10, good fit: < .05; Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, & Müller, 2003). The chi-square test 
was reported but not taken into consideration when assessing model fit, because it is 
oversensitive to sample size and would almost certainly indicate inadequate model fit 
(Meade, Johnson, & Braddy, 2008). Model comparison was based on the overall model fit 
indices, the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC), 
and the Akaike weights (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004). 
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Figure 1. Illustration of common cause model (a) and dynamic mutualism model (b), for 
z-proso dataset. Circles indicate latent variables, rectangles indicate observed variables, 
and triangles indicate intercepts. Double-headed arrows indicate covariances (purple) 
and variances (black). Dashed lines show the parameters that were only included in the 
exploratory analyses. Single-headed arrows denote regressions. Green single-headed 
arrows indicate self-feedback parameters (β). Orange single-headed arrows indicate 
coupling parameters (γ). A “1” shows that the parameter has been constrained to one. 
The illustration only depicts a limited number of waves and one observed variable per 
factor, for visual clarity. 
(a) Common cause model 
(b) Dynamic mutualism model 
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Measurement invariance. We tested increasingly strict assumptions for longitudinal 
measurement invariance. For inferences about changes in factor means over time, strong 
factorial invariance must hold (Meredith, 1993). To test invariance, we sequentially 
established equality constraints over time (Widaman, Ferrer, & Conger, 2010). We 
constrained factor loadings, intercepts, and error terms in that sequence, across time points. 
Changes in the comparative factor index (ΔCFI) were used to test for measurement 
invariance (Cheung and Rensvold, 2002). When strong invariance was violated, we loosened 
intercept constraints for each noninvariant factor separately. Item intercepts were freed 
sequentially, starting from the item with the largest modification index, until partial 
invariance was achieved. We compared the results from the fully invariant models with those 
from the partially invariant models, to test the practical significance of assuming strong 
invariance (Widaman et al., 2010). 
Exploratory analyses. To test the hypothesis that the p-factor can exhaustively explain its 
development, we estimated a model with freely estimated covariances among change scores 
over time. We then used a likelihood ratio test to compare it to the common cause model with 
covariances constrained to zero. 
Dataset 2: SHARE 
Participants. The data were acquired from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in 
Europe (SHARE). SHARE is a European multinational longitudinal project. The study 
population consists of all persons 33 years or older that have their regular residency at a 
SHARE country, at the time of sampling. The target sample was acquired using probability 
sampling with maximum population coverage in each country. This ensured that every person 
within the population had a probability greater than zero to be selected into the sample. To 
enable valid inferences for the target population, weighted sample statistics were used to 
mitigate bias resulting from the unequal probability each individual has to be selected in the 
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target sample. In the current study, the sample consists of 3,969 persons who had at least one 
measure of interest (i.e. one item on the EURO-D scale), throughout the five waves of 
interest (waves 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6). Each respective measurement wave is at a two-year distance 
from its predecessor, apart from the collection at wave 4 which commenced four years after 
the previous measurement at wave 2. All missing data (0.04%) was assumed to be missing at 
random. For further information regarding data collection and sample characteristics, we 
refer the reader to the SHARE website (http://www.share-project.org). 
Measures. Data collection was conducted using computer-assisted personal interviewing 
(CAPI). All questionnaires were translated into the participants’ native language using an 
online translation tool. The present study utilized the EURO-D scale to assess symptoms of 
major depressive disorder (Prince et al., 1999). This scale includes items covering the 
symptoms of depression, pessimism, suicidality, guilt, sleep, interest, irritability, appetite, 
fatigue, concentration, enjoyment, and tearfulness. All symptoms assessed for prevalence 
within the last month. Each symptom is measured using one item on a binary scale, with 0 
corresponding to “not present” and 1 to “present”. Thus, the total score is measured on an 
ordinal scale with a maximum score of 12. Several studies have investigated the 
psychometric properties of the EURO-D scale. The internal consistency of the EURO-D was 
found to range from 0.58 to 0.80 across countries, as indexed by the standardized alpha. The 
criterion validity of the scale was deemed sufficient. Associations with different continuous 
measures of depression ranged from r = 0.70 to 0.93 across sites and the area under the ROC 
curve indicated strong associations between the EURO-D and other dichotomous measures 
(0.83-0.93; Prince et al., 1999). In a different study, internal consistency was measured at a = 
0.75 and test-retest reliability at kappa = 0.60. Moreover, criterion validity was indexed at 
0.92 by the area under the ROC curve when predicting DSM-III-R major depression 
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diagnosis by psychiatrists (Larraga et al., 2006). All items were (re)coded so that “1” 
indicates the presence of symptoms and “0” their absence. 
Item parceling. To aid distributional assumptions we allocated the binary EURO-D 
symptom items to parcels (Bandalos, 2002; Hau & Marsh, 2004; MacCallum, Widaman, 
Zhang, & Hong, 1999; Matsunaga, 2008; Nunnally, 1978). The two parcels we created, 
mirror the two factors that have been identified in previous psychometric analyses using the 
EURO-D scale (Castro-Costa et al., 2008; Guerra, et al., 2015; Prince et al., 1999). The first 
parcel representing the “affective suffering” construct, included the items of sadness, 
suicidality, guilt, sleeplessness, irritability, appetite, fatigue, and tearfulness. The second 
parcel representing the “motivation” construct, included the items of pessimism, interest, 
concentration, and enjoyment. Both parcels were assumed to be continuous. 
Statistical analyses (dataset 2: SHARE) 
 Below we will describe the specification, estimation, and assessment of the models 
used to compare common cause theory with dynamic mutualism. This section follows the 
same structure as the z-proso statistical analysis section (measurement models → structural 
models → estimation and fit). The assessment of measurement invariance was the same for 
both datasets. Thus, the procedure will not be repeated. 
Measurement model for common cause theory. To model major depressive disorder as a 
reflective latent variable we constructed a one-factor model, which conceptualizes the latent 
factor of major depression as the direct cause for the covariation among the two parcels. 
Confirmatory factor models were estimated at each time point. 
Measurement model for dynamic mutualism theory. A measurement model was not 
specified for the dynamic mutualism model, because the structural model for dynamic 
mutualism theory specified the direct interrelations between the two parcel indicators. 
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Structural model for common cause theory. At each wave, we conceptualized parcel 
scores as a function of the depression factor score (Figure 2a). The depression factor 
influenced its own change through a self-feedback parameter (β). We estimated the mean and 
variance of the latent change score factor at each time point. The mean and variance of the 
depression factor were measured at time 1 and equality constrained over time. To allow 
indicator specific variance, we allowed residual terms to covary between time points for each 
indicator with itself (Kievit et al., 2017). Moreover, age at time 1 was included as a covariate 
to control for the influence of age on the baseline score of the depression factor. Lastly, we 
imposed measurement invariance over time. 
Structural model for dynamic mutualism theory. In this model, no common factor that 
causes the covariation among the two parcels was specified (Figure 2b). Instead, we 
conceptualized latent change scores as the function of a coupling process (γ) and a self-
feedback process (β). The two parcels directly influenced each other’s change and their own 
change over time. All observed variables were allowed to correlate at time 1. We estimated 
the mean and variance of the latent change score factors at each time point. The mean and 
variance of the two parcels were measured at time 1 and equality constrained over time. We 
allowed latent change factors to correlate with each other within and between time points, to 
capture the relationship between them after any possible coupling effects. Lastly, age at time 
1 was included as a covariate to control for the influence of age on baseline parcel scores. 
(a) Common cause model 
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Exploratory statistical analyses. We extended our models in two exploratory analyses. 
First, to test the hypothesis that the depression factor was the sole influence of its change, we 
allowed the change scores of the common cause model to correlate over time. This allowed 
us to capture their relationship after any possible self-feedback effects. Second, to test 
whether the rate of developmental change in psychopathology was solely explained by the 
dynamics within the two models, we estimated the direct effect of age on change scores 
(Kievit et al., 2017). We conducted likelihood ratio tests to assess whether the added 
parameters significantly improved the models. 
Preregistration 
Figure 2. Illustration of common cause model (a) and dynamic mutualism model (b) for 
SHARE dataset. Circles indicate latent variables, rectangles indicate parcels, and 
triangles indicate intercepts. Double-headed arrows indicate covariances (purple) and 
variances (black). Dashed lines indicate parameters that were only included in 
exploratory analyses. Single-headed arrows denote regressions. Green single-headed 
arrows indicate self-feedback parameters (β). Orange single-headed arrows indicate 
coupling parameters (γ). Gray single-headed arrows indicate associations with age at 
time 1 (T1). A “1” shows that the parameter has been constrained to one. The illustration 
only depicts three out of five waves (both models) and does not depict covariances 
between change scores across time (dynamic mutualism model only), for visual clarity. 
(b) Dynamic mutualism model 
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 All confirmatory analyses were conducted according to our preregistered plan 
(https://osf.io/a4ywe/?view_only=498f5640c18847bea3ac6a9b0b596821), deviations from 
the initial plan are reported in Table C1, Appendix C. 
Results 
Dataset 1: z-proso 
Factor specification. Exploratory factor analyses showed that the optimal four-factor 
solution varied over the four waves. Hence, we chose to theoretically specify the item content 
of the four factors. Factor loadings for the 42 symptom items are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Factor loadings for four first-order factors 
Items Abbreviated content Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 
Prosociality  
K5_614   Feel sympathy 0.780 0.788 0.801 0.775 
K5_604   Understand feelings 0.528 0.546 0.575 0.505 
K5_607   Share with others 0.433 0.424 0.432 0.403 
K5_611   Settle dispute 0.512 0.479 0.506 0.455 
K5_620   Try to comfort 0.402 0.365 0.376 0.295 
K5_617   Try to help injured 0.678 0.633 0.627 0.690 
K5_601   Help clear up 0.792 0.772 0.776 0.773 
K5_625   Sympathy for feel bad 0.840 0.833 0.843 0.818 
K5_623   Listen to other opinion 0.491 0.478 0.509 0.463 
K5_626   Sympathy for bullied 0.701 0.687 0.711 0.603 
Externalizing  
K5_618  Aggressive if something taken 0.688 0.677 0.685 0.524 
K5_603  Aggressive when teased 0.446 0.421 0.360 0.317 
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K5_605  Bad things behind back 0.444 0.431 0.392 0.370 
K5_602  Hit parent 0.676 0.640 0.604 0.590 
K5_608  Violent attack 0.756 0.750 0.770 0.742 
K5_609  Boss others around 0.507 0.474 0.381 0.299 
K5_629  Aggressive when insulted 0.741 0.749 0.749 0.405 
K5_610  Lie to parent 0.360 0.299 0.263 0.235 
K5_612  Incite other to dislike 0.524 0.476 0.453 0.437 
K5_613  Hit, bite, kick others 0.725 0.733 0.726 0.759 
K5_630  Humiliate others 0.671 0.653 0.653 0.663 
K5_615  Yell at parent 0.350 0.305 0.278 0.249 
K5_616  Active exclusion 0.472 0.461 0.452 0.514 
K5_633  Told secrets when mad 0.442 0.446 0.431 0.415 
K5_606  Scare to force others 0.371 0.350 0.407 0.396 
K5_619  Threat others to get something 0.596 0.574 0.580 0.595 
K5_621  Throw things at parent 0.402 0.365 0.344 0.380 
K5_622  Engage in brawl 0.666 0.644 0.665 0.675 
K5_624 Mad not getting something 0.513 0.475 0.446 0.405 
Internalizing  
K5_657  Sad without reason 0.657 0.656 0.676 0.708 
K5_652  Cried 0.644 0.661 0.662 0.664 
K5_653  Fear 0.636 0.655 0.639 0.650 
K5_654  Unhappy 0.749 0.773 0.786 0.790 
K5_651  Bored 0.743 0.761 0.755 0.763 
K5_656  Couldn’t fall asleep 0.481 0.512 0.534 0.547 
K5_655  Felt alone 0.272 0.307 0.311 0.310 
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K5_658  Worried 0.662 0.699 0.723 0.761 
K5_659 Self-injury 0.309 0.352 0.376 0.453 
ADHD  
K5_627 Restless 0.640 0.687 0.717 0.698 
K5_628 Difficulties to concentrate 0.591 0.665 0.658 0.654 
K5_631 Inattentive 0.525 0.567 0.598 0.651 
K5_632 Hectic and fidgety 0.682 0.730 0.751 0.760 
Note: Cross-loadings in confirmatory factor model were constrained to zero. 
 
Measurement invariance. Temporal invariance did not hold for both the common cause 
model and the dynamic mutualism model. Imposing weak measurement invariance led to a 
negligible drop in fit for both models (Common cause: ΔCFI = 0.005; Mutualism: ΔCFI = 
0.002; Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). Conversely, constraining intercepts to be equal over time 
led to a substantial drop in model fit for both models (Common cause: ΔCFI = 0.031; 
Mutualism: ΔCFI = 0.029). The violation of temporal invariance is in line with dynamic 
mutualism theory but does not necessarily imply mutualism, because many alternative causes 
of non-invariance exist (e.g. response shift bias; Fokkema, Smits, Kelderman, & Cuijpers, 
2013). Next, we compared the results from the fully invariant models with the partially 
Table 2 
Model comparison fit statistics for z-proso models 
Model χ2 df RMSEA CFI SRMR 
Common cause < 0.001  13835 0.034 [0.034, 0.035] 0.749 0.108 
Dynamic mutualism < 0.001 13716 0.031 [0.031, 0.032] 0.795 0.067 
Exploratory common cause* < 0.001 13832 0.034 [0.034, 0.035] 0.749 0.108 
Note: *Common cause model with residual change score covariances. 
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invariant models, to test the practical significance of assuming strong measurement 
invariance (Widaman et al., 2010). 
Model comparison. The dynamic mutualism model fit best according to all preregistered fit 
statistics, and both models fit the data well according to all fit indices except the comparative 
fit index (Table 2). This conclusion is mirrored by the information criteria (AIC and BIC; 
Figure 3), which were used to control for complexity in terms of the number of freely 
estimated parameters. The Akaike weights show that given our data the mutualism model is 
99.99% more likely to be the better model (Figure 3). The partially invariant models mirrored 
these conclusions. All fit indices indicated that the partially invariant mutualism model was 
preferable over the partially invariant common cause model (Table A1, Appendix A). Hence, 
the violation of temporal invariance was deemed to be of little practical significance 
(Widaman et al., p.13). Further investigations were carried out using the fully invariant 
models. 
 
(a) (b) 
  
Figure 3. Information criteria AIC and BIC (a) and Akaike weights indicating normalized 
probabilties (b). 
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Model parameters. We proceeded to closely examine the item content of the best fitting 
model, the dynamic mutualism model. All regression parameters are reported in Table A2, 
Appendix A. Psychopathology domains were significantly correlated at baseline, except for 
ADHD and prosociality that were not significantly related (b = -0.48, p = 0.15). Persons 
varied substantially in their rate of change, as indexed by the significant variance in change 
scores in all measured domains (Table A3, Appendix A). 
 On all measurement occasions, higher scores on all domains predicted a greater 
decrease in themselves at the succeeding wave. The self-feedback parameters ranged from 
small to moderate (r = -0.197 – -0.550, r2 = 3.88 – 30.25%). Most coupling effects were not 
significant; of the significant ones, there was a mixture of negative and positive coupling 
parameters. The externalizing dimension was only associated with change in one domain at 
one time-point. Higher scores in the externalizing domain at time 1 were associated with a 
greater decrease in internalizing at time 2 (r = -0.125, r2 = 1.56%). Prosociality influenced the 
internalizing and externalizing dimensions, though not consistently. Higher prosociality 
scores at time 3 predicted a greater increase in internalizing at time 4 (r = 0.213, r2 = 4.54%). 
Higher scores in prosociality at time 1 predicted a larger increase in externalizing at time 2 (r 
= 0.092, r2 = 0.85%). ADHD scores were not significantly associated with change in any 
dimension. Lastly, higher scores on the internalizing dimension at time 1, were associated 
with a greater increase in ADHD at time 2 (r = 0.146, r2 = 2.13%) and a greater decrease in 
prosociality at time 2 (r = -0.067, r2 = 0.45%). 
Exploratory analyses. In line with the hypothesis that a causal p-factor is the sole influence 
of its own change, an exploratory common cause model that allowed change scores to be 
related after self-feedback effects did not fit better than the preregistered common cause 
model (Δχ2(3) = 6.61, p = 0.09). 
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Dataset 2: SHARE 
Measurement invariance. Temporal invariance was not violated for the common cause 
model. Imposing weak measurement invariance did not change model fit (ΔCFI = 0.000), and 
neither did imposing strong measurement invariance (ΔCFI = 0.000; Cheung & Resvold, 
2002). 
 
Model comparison. We fitted both models to the data to determine which best explains the 
development of the positive manifold within major depressive disorder, over the measured 
waves. None of the preregistered fit indices showed preferential support for either model, 
except for the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) which supported the 
common cause model (Table 3). The information criteria (AIC and BIC; Figure 4), which 
were used to control for complexity in terms of the number of freely estimated parameters, 
portrayed a similarly, mixed picture. The Akaike weights show that given our data the 
dynamic mutualism model is 99.83% more likely to be the best model, while the Schwarz 
weights support the opposite conclusion (the common cause model is 99.99% more likely to 
be the best model; Figure 4). In comparison to the AIC, the BIC criterion places a higher 
penalty on complexity that scales with sample size. This may explain the antithetical 
conclusions. 
Model parameters. Since we were unable to establish the superiority of either model, we 
closely examined the parameters of both models. 
Table 3 
Model comparison fit statistics SHARE data 
Model χ2 df RMSEA CFI SRMR 
Common cause < 0.001  28 0.039 [0.034, 0.045] 0.980 0.026 
Dynamic mutualism < 0.001 8 0.066 [0.057, 0.076] 0.983 0.031 
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Common cause model. All regression parameters are presented in Table B1, Appendix B. 
We found considerable interindividual variability in the rate of change of the common factor 
(Table B2, Appendix B). Age at baseline predicted common factor scores at baseline, as 
evidenced by the substantial drop in fit after we fixed the effect of age at baseline on the 
common factor at baseline, to 0 (Δχ2(1) = 24.43, p < .001). Over most measurement waves 
higher scores on the depression factor were associated with a greater decrease in depression 
at the next time point. The negative self-feedback parameters were of moderate size (r = -
0.227—0.362, r2 = 5.29—12.96%). The relationship between the depression factor at time 3 
and change at time 4 was the exception to this pattern, with higher scores on the depression 
factor predicting a greater increase in depression scores. The positive self-feedback parameter 
was in the small range (r = .131, r2 = 1.71%). 
Dynamic mutualism model. All regression parameters are reported in Table B3, Appendix B. 
We found evidence for individual differences in the rate of change within both domains 
(Table B2, Appendix B). Age at baseline predicted parcel scores at baseline (Δχ2(2) = 19.23, 
p < .001) and residual change score covariances substantially impacted model fit (Δχ2(26) = 
1690.5, p < .001). This indicates the existence of unmeasured influences on change within the 
two domains and/or temporal mismatch between measurement and the natural pace of change 
(Hofman et al., in review). 
Self-feedback effects. The affective suffering domain only substantially influenced its own 
change at the second measurement wave. Higher affective suffering scores at time 1 were  
associated with a greater decrease in affective suffering at time 2 (r = -0.562, r2 = 31.58%). 
The same was evident in the motivation domain. Higher scores on motivation at time 1 were 
associated with a greater decrease in the motivation domain at time 2 (r = -0.640, r2 = 
40.96%).  
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Coupling effects. Most coupling effects indicated that scores on the motivation domain were 
not significantly associated with change in the affective suffering domain. The exception was 
higher scores on motivation at time 1, which predicted a greater increase in affective 
suffering at time 2 (r = 0.063, r2 = 0.40%). The affective suffering domain was significantly 
associated with change in motivation in half of the measurement occasions. Higher scores in 
affective suffering at time 1 and time 3, were associated with a greater increase in the 
motivation domain at time 2 (r = 0.049, r2 = 0.24%) and time 4 (r = 0.101, r2 =1.02%), 
respectively. 
Exploratory analyses. Fit statistics for the exploratory models are presented in Table B4, 
Appendix B. First, our results did not support the hypothesis that the common cause factor is 
solely responsible for its own change, since allowing change scores to covary over time led to 
Figure 4. Normalized probabilities indicated by Schwarz weights (a) and Akaike 
weights (b), and AIC and BIC information criteria (c) for each model. 
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substantial improvement in model fit (Δχ2(6) = 65.98, p < 0.001). Second, both models failed 
to capture all age-related dynamics, since allowing age to directly affect change scores led to 
a significant improvement in model fit (Common cause: Δχ2(4) = 110.71, p < 0.001; 
Mutualism: Δχ2(8) = 202.93, p < 0.001). 
Discussion 
 To gain insight into the ontogeny and ontology of psychiatric dimensions, we directly 
compared the ability of dynamic mutualism theory and common cause theory to explain the 
development of the positive manifold at multiple levels of the hierarchical taxonomy—the p-
factor from early to late adolescence and major depressive disorder from middle adulthood to 
old age. 
Interpretation of major findings 
 At the level of the p-factor, the dynamic mutualism model provided a better account 
of development than the common cause model and a hybrid (common cause) model that 
allowed unmeasured factors to influence the development of the p-factor. However, all three 
models fit the data poorly according to the confirmatory factor index. At the level of major 
depressive disorder, it was not clear which model provided a better explanation of 
development, as different fit indices supported a different model. Both models fit the data 
well, but neither model could exhaustively explain all age-related developmental dynamics 
and exploratory analyses supported the possibility that unmeasured factors (e.g. life events) 
affected the rate of change. 
 Our findings strongly question the assumption that symptoms cohere due to a singular 
causal mechanism. But do not invalidate the predictive utility of constructs such as the p-
factor, which has been correlated with numerous risk factors and deleterious outcomes (Caspi 
et al., 2014; Lahey et al., 2012, 2015; Martel et al., 2017; Snyder et al., 2017; Waldman, 
Poore, van Hulle, Rathouz, & Lahey, 2016). In many cases, coupling between symptoms 
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and/or syndromes may explain the development of psychopathology. But mutualistic 
coupling may not be sufficient either. 
 Multiple external factors may compose key drivers of developmental change. Our 
models did not include such factors, which might explain the unexpected finding that 
multiple coupling parameters were negative. This is especially likely given the large amount 
of time between measurements. That is, within one year many unmeasured factors may have 
influenced change in a given domain, which may have biased its statistical associations with 
other domains. This limitation is an artifact of currently available longitudinal data. But also 
expose the vagueness of dynamic mutualism theory, which does not explicate the time it 
takes for developmental processes to unfold, nor does it state exactly how internal and 
external factors might interact. Future studies should use measurements with greater temporal 
density to empirically inform theory about the temporal pace of hypothesized developmental 
mechanisms and seek to specify functional associations between symptoms and relevant 
external factors. 
A hybrid approach to understanding psychopathology 
 In line with previous conclusions, neither theory could fully explain the development 
of psychopathology (Greene & Eaton, 2017; McElroy et al., 2018; Murray et al., 2016; 
Snyder et al., 2017). Hence, it may be better to start looking at what percentage of variance in 
the developmental dynamics of psychopathology each theory can explain. Hybrid models 
may provide promising multicausal explanations for the development of psychopathology 
(Fried & Cramer, 2017). For instance, general vulnerability to psychopathology may 
reinforce causal interactions between symptoms by lowering their activation threshold. This 
can increase the probability that symptoms are caused by environmental events and other 
symptoms. In turn, symptoms may exacerbate this general vulnerability (e.g. effect of sleep 
on stress response system; Koss & Gunnar, 2018; Ly, McGrath, & Gouin, 2015). 
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Alternatively, specific types of latent causes may lead to specific disorders and interactions 
among the presenting symptoms and environmental factors may lead to comorbidity. This 
would be consistent with an interpretation of the p-factor as an amalgamation of distinct 
causes (Krueger et al., 2018; Watts et al., 2019) that may cohere due to the causal 
interrelations among their outcomes. Both scenarios, and multiple others (see Fried & 
Cramer, 2017 for more examples) where latent pathophysiology co-exists, and possibly 
interacts, with mechanisms at the level of manifest psychopathology, may explain the 
development of the positive manifold. Moreover, different mechanisms and their interactions 
may lead to the development of different disorders and the same disorder may be explained 
by several mechanisms (Borsboom, Cramer, & Kalis, 2019). Thus, a multicausal framework 
may be most suited to understand mental illness (Kendler, 2019). 
Implications for current practices 
 Our understanding of the mechanisms that drive the development of psychopathology 
is still in its infancy, and the lack of evidence supporting a monocausal explanation should 
inspire skepticism about practices predicated on the assumption that disorders reflect a 
common cause. First, a monocausal interpretation of disorders neglects heterogeneity in 
symptoms and their causes. Neglect of symptom heterogeneity is commonly seen in 
diagnostic schemes that use symptoms as interchangeable indicators of a disorder (e.g. 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) and in the widespread use of diverse measurement instruments to measure 
the same disorder (Fried, 2017). Consequently, we may be lumping persons with 
meaningfully diverse pathologies at every stage of clinical research and practice (Fried, 
2015). Second, it is uncertain what (reflective) latent variables that summarize the shared 
variance between items represent if this shared variance is not solely due to a common cause. 
Presently, reflective latent variables are used to represent all dimensions of psychopathology. 
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The shared variance that composes the variance of some dimensions may represent the 
concert action of several mechanisms, which calls to question the explanatory utility of 
research that aims to explain the variance in plausibly confounded reflective latent variables. 
For explanatory research, reflective latent variables should be constructed at the right level of 
resolution to capture a discrete source of shared variance. Hence, research initiatives that 
wish to describe, explain, and modify psychopathology by leveraging a hierarchical factor 
model (e.g. HiTOP; Caspi et al., 2014; Kotov et al., 2017; Lahey et al., 2012, 2017), could 
largely benefit from establishing the ontology of quantitative dimensions to ascertain which 
dimensions are suitable for explanatory work and which are better suited for prediction. 
Limitations and future recommendations 
 The results of the current study should be viewed considering several limitations. 
First, in the dynamic mutualism models, we specified causal interrelations between all the 
constituent parts of the model. However, it is more likely that a psychopathology network 
includes both direct and indirect associations. A fruitful avenue for future research could be 
to directly compare mutualism models that include different causal paths to improve our 
understanding of causal associations and improve the specificity of theory. 
 Second, we used item parcels to normalize data, but it is questionable whether the 
parcels reflect substantive constructs. Although the content of the parcels was based on 
constructs that have been recurrently identified in prior studies using the EURO-D scale 
(Castro-Costa et al., 2008; Guerra et al., 2016; Prince et al., 1999), the constructs are 
quantitative creations and the theoretical coherence between the items is questionable. 
Additionally, parcels attribute equal weight to all items, which can lead to bias proportional 
to the difference between the item coefficient in the true model and the weight specified by 
the sum score (Bollen & Bauldry, 2011). We would ideally use multi-item continuous 
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measures of individual symptoms to create a dynamic mutualism model that specifies 
interrelations among symptoms directly. 
 Third, for the means of testing the ontology of the p-factor, we assumed that broad 
transdiagnostic constructs are adequately described using reflective latent variables. 
However, it may be that these dimensions are, at least partly, the product of mutualistic 
coupling among symptoms. Future work would benefit from assessing the mechanisms that 
explain the coherence among symptoms starting from the lowest levels of abstraction. This 
would prevent the misuse of reflective latent variables to summarize variance when a 
different model is appropriate (Rhemtulla, van Bork, & Borsboom, 2019). 
 Fourth, the findings of the present study are limited to the populations assessed in the 
analyzed samples and to the measured dimensions of psychopathology. Further research 
focusing on different developmental periods could assess homogeneity in psychological 
processes throughout development.  
 Generally, future work should aim to cumulatively build a theoretical foundation for 
psychiatry (Kendler, 2009). Recent technological innovations provide us the privilege to 
formalize theory via computational models and accelerate cumulative theory construction 
(Robinaugh et al., in review). Computational models promote the precise specification of 
functional associations among elements and constitute a valuable continuation to necessarily 
imprecise verbal theories (Smaldino, 2017). Precision ensures that hypotheses are falsifiable, 
and theories are amenable to cumulative modification that can edge us closer to 
understanding the complex phenomenon of mental illness. 
Conclusion 
 We echo recent calls for the abandonment of a monocausal framework to explain 
mental illness (Borsboom et al., 2019; Kendler, 2019) and reinforce this argument through 
the first direct comparison between dynamic mutualism theory and common cause theory. 
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Neither of our models provides the best possible explanation for the development of 
psychopathology, but rather our findings illustrate the abstractness of currently dominant 
theories and expose gaps in our understanding. We hope that our models will provide the 
necessary stimulation to start a conversation around formalized theory, to build a solid base 
for the future of psychiatry. 
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Appendix A: Supplementary material for z-proso dataset 
 
Table A1 
Partially invariant model comparison (z-proso) 
Exploratory models 
Model χ2 df RMSEA CFI SRMR 
Common cause < 0.001  13820 0.038 [0.037, 0.038] 0.704 0.113 
Dynamic mutualism < 0.001 13704 0.035 [0.034, 0.035] 0.751 0.088 
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Table A2 
Regression parameters for dynamic mutualism model (z-proso) 
Regressions Estimate   Std.Err   z-value   P(>|z|) ci.lower  ci.upper Std.all 
dINT1 ~                                                                    
INTlv_T1             -0.385 0.044 -8.822 0.000 -0.470 -0.299 -0.400 
EXTlv_T1          -0.146 0.050 -2.916 0.004 -0.244 -0.048 -0.125 
PSlv_T1           -0.032 0.031 -1.044 0.297 -0.093  0.028 -0.037 
ADHDlv_T1           0.094 0.049  1.927 0.054 -0.002  0.189  0.092 
dINT2 ~                                                                                               
INTlv_T2          -0.168 0.077 -2.185 0.029 -0.318 -0.017 -0.197 
EXTlv_T2           0.011 0.087  0.122 0.903 -0.160  0.181  0.009 
PSlv_T2           -0.093 0.064 -1.446 0.148 -0.219  0.033 -0.103 
ADHDlv_T2           0.020 0.082  0.243 0.808 -0.142  0.182  0.021 
dINT3 ~                                                                                               
INTlv_T3          -0.188 0.109 -1.727 0.084 -0.401  0.025 -0.214 
EXTlv_T3          -0.136 0.143 -0.955 0.340 -0.416  0.143 -0.089 
PSlv_T3            0.205 0.101  2.039 0.041  0.008  0.402  0.213 
ADHDlv_T3           0.079 0.111  0.714 0.475 -0.139  0.298  0.083 
dEXT1 ~                                                                                                 
EXTlv_T1          -0.464 0.042 11.099 0.000 -0.546 -0.382 -0.539 
INTlv_T1           -0.002 0.027 -0.079 0.937 -0.054  0.050 -0.003 
PSlv_T1            0.059 0.022  2.668 0.008  0.016  0.102  0.092 
ADHDlv_T1         -0.036 0.032 -1.129 0.259 -0.100  0.027 -0.049 
dEXT2 ~                                                                                                 
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EXTlv_T2          -0.273 0.071 -3.871 0.000 -0.411 -0.135 -0.341 
INTlv_T2            0.023 0.047  0.483 0.629 -0.070  0.115  0.042 
PSlv_T2            0.049 0.044  1.107 0.268 -0.038  0.135  0.084 
ADHDlv_T2          -0.008 0.047 -0.161 0.872 -0.100  0.085 -0.013 
dEXT3 ~                                                                                                 
EXTlv_T3          -0.433 0.072 -5.992 0.000 -0.575 -0.292 -0.550 
INTlv_T3            0.021 0.045  0.481 0.631 -0.066  0.109  0.047 
PSlv_T3            0.064 0.050  1.296 0.195 -0.033  0.162  0.130 
ADHDlv_T3         -0.038 0.047 -0.799 0.424 -0.130  0.055 -0.077 
dPS1 ~                                                                                                  
PSlv_T1           -0.454 0.029 15.702 0.000 -0.511 -0.397 -0.530 
INTlv_T1          -0.064 0.032 -1.995 0.046 -0.127 -0.001 -0.067 
EXTlv_T1            0.041 0.047  0.862 0.389 -0.052  0.134  0.035 
ADHDlv_T1           0.023 0.038  0.621 0.534 -0.051  0.097  0.023 
dPS2 ~                                                                                                  
PSlv_T2           -0.208 0.065 -3.198 0.001 -0.336 -0.081 -0.248 
INTlv_T2          -0.030 0.068 -0.447 0.655 -0.163  0.103 -0.038 
EXTlv_T2          -0.030 0.085 -0.348 0.728 -0.197  0.138 -0.026 
ADHDlv_T2           0.024 0.072  0.329 0.742 -0.118  0.165  0.027 
dPS3 ~                                                                                                  
PSlv_T3           -0.446 0.085 -5.247 0.000 -0.613 -0.280 -0.525 
INTlv_T3          -0.162 0.083 -1.953 0.051 -0.324  0.001 -0.209 
EXTlv_T3            0.094 0.120  0.786 0.432 -0.141  0.329  0.070 
ADHDlv_T3          0.004 0.092  0.043 0.966 -0.176  0.184  0.005 
dADHD1 ~                                                                                                 
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ADHDlv_T1         -0.392 0.047 -8.294 0.000 -0.485 -0.299 -0.422 
INTlv_T1            0.128 0.038  3.380 0.001  0.054  0.203  0.146 
EXTlv_T1          -0.095 0.049 -1.956 0.051 -0.190  0.000 -0.089 
PSlv_T1            0.002 0.032  0.071 0.943 -0.060  0.065  0.003 
dADHD2 ~                                                                                                 
ADHDlv_T2         -0.204 0.087 -2.336 0.019 -0.375 -0.033 -0.233 
INTlv_T2            0.033 0.077  0.430 0.667 -0.117  0.183  0.041 
EXTlv_T2            0.119 0.096  1.240 0.215 -0.069  0.306  0.102 
PSlv_T2            0.026 0.072  0.366 0.715 -0.114  0.167  0.031 
dADHD3 ~                                                                                                 
ADHDlv_T3         -0.281 0.104 -2.696 0.007 -0.485 -0.077 -0.340 
INTlv_T3            0.156 0.099  1.578 0.114 -0.038  0.350  0.206 
EXTlv_T3          -0.061 0.128 -0.477 0.634 -0.313  0.190 -0.046 
PSlv_T3           -0.001 0.100 -0.006 0.995 -0.196  0.195 -0.001 
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Table A3 
Change score variances for dynamic mutualism model (z-proso) 
Change scores Estimate   Std.Err   z-value   P(>|z|)  ci.lower  ci.upper Std.all 
dINT1   0.416 0.030 13.805 0.000 0.357 0.475 0.839 
dINT2   0.415 0.033 12.561 0.000 0.350 0.480 0.891 
dINT3   0.464 0.040 11.461 0.000 0.385 0.543 0.880 
dEXT1   0.192 0.017 11.226 0.000 0.158 0.225 0.714 
dEXT2   0.145 0.018  8.093 0.000 0.110 0.180 0.744 
dEXT3   0.086 0.012  7.160 0.000 0.062 0.109 0.610 
dPS1    0.360 0.023 15.392 0.000 0.314 0.406 0.742 
dPS2    0.344 0.025 13.496 0.000 0.294 0.394 0.848 
dPS3    0.272 0.021 12.826 0.000 0.231 0.314 0.660 
dADHD1 0.337 0.026 13.039 0.000 0.286 0.388 0.818 
dADHD2 0.366 0.031 11.710 0.000 0.305 0.428 0.886 
dADHD3 0.311 0.032  9.829 0.000 0.249 0.373 0.787 
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Appendix B: Supplementary material for SHARE dataset 
Table B1 
Self-feedback parameters for common cause model (SHARE)  
Regressions Estimate   Std.Err   z-value P(>|z|)  ci.lower  ci.upper    Std.all 
dpft2 ~          
    pft1      -0.231      0.086 -2.694      0.007  -0.400  -0.063   -0.362 
dpft3 ~                                 
    pft2      -0.153          0.094 -1.625      0.104  -0.339   0.032   -0.227 
dpft4 ~                                
    pft3      0.109                0.088 1.243     0.214  0.063  0.281    0.131 
dpft5 ~                                 
    pft4      -0.234 0.041 -5.670  0.000  -0.315  -0.153   -0.335 
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Table B2 
Change score variances for common cause mode and dynamic mutualism model 
Common cause model 
Change score Estimate   Std.Err   z-value P(>|z|)  ci.lower  ci.upper    Std.all   
dpft2 0.143 0.045 3.170 0.002  0.055 0.232 0.869   
dpft3 0.165 0.036 4.514 0.000  0.093 0.236 0.948   
dpft4 0.299 0.056 5.326 0.000  0.189 0.410 0.983   
dpft5 0.364 0.057 6.350 0.000  0.251 0.476 0.888   
Dynamic mutualism model 
Change scores Estimate Std. Err z-value P(>|z|)  ci.lower  ci.upper    Std.all   
dsad1        1.623   0.044   36.856  0.000   1.537  1.709  0.696   
dsad2        2.317   0.114   20.302  0.000   2.093  2.541  0.948   
dsad3        2.401   0.137   17.566  0.000   2.133  2.669  1.014   
dsad4        2.221   0.135   16.417  0.000   1.955  2.486  0.944   
dsleep1     0.319  0.014  22.639 0.000  0.291 0.346 0.602  
dsleep2     0.610  0.062  9.848  0.000   0.489  0.731  1.004    
dsleep3     0.582  0.055  10.665 0.000  0.475 0.689 0.866  
dsleep4     0.712  0.099  7.166  0.000   0.518  0.907  1.125    
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Table B3 
Self-feedback and coupling parameters for dynamic mutualism model (SHARE) 
Regression Estimate SE z-value p-value CIlower CIupper Std.lv Std.all 
daff1 ~                                                                                  
affect1           -0.596     0.017   -35.614     0.000    -0.629    -0.564    -0.391    -0.562 
mot1               0.154     0.042      3.705      0.000      0.073      0.236      0.101      0.063 
daff2 ~                                                                                  
affect2           -0.058     0.053    -1.101      0.271    -0.161      0.045    -0.037    -0.052 
mot2              -0.056     0.192    -0.295      0.768    -0.432      0.319    -0.036    -0.021 
daff3 ~                                                                                  
affect3            0.016     0.058      0.280      0.780    -0.098      0.131      0.011      0.016 
mot3              -0.037     0.194    -0.189      0.850    -0.418      0.344    -0.024    -0.016 
daff4 ~                                                                                  
affect4           -0.053  0.061  -0.875      0.382    -0.173      0.066    -0.035    -0.055 
mot4              -0.232 0.225 -1.033      0.302    -0.672      0.208    -0.151    -0.105 
dmot1 ~                                                                                
mot1              -0.749     0.022   -33.452     0.000    -0.793    -0.705    -1.029    -0.640 
affect1            0.025     0.007      3.662      0.000  0.012      0.038      0.034  0.049 
dmot2 ~                                                                                
mot2               0.001     0.116      0.011      0.991    -0.227      0.230      0.002      0.001 
affect2            0.013     0.027      0.479      0.632    -0.039      0.065      0.016      0.023 
dmot3 ~                                                                                
mot3              -0.171     0.106    -1.617      0.106    -0.378      0.036    -0.208    -0.139 
affect3            0.055     0.029      1.934      0.053    -0.001      0.111      0.067      0.101 
dmot4 ~                                                                                
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mot4               0.139     0.146      0.953      0.341    -0.147      0.425      0.175      0.122 
affect4           -0.042     0.036    -1.171      0.242    -0.113      0.028    -0.053    -0.084 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B4 
Model comparison fit statistics SHARE data 
Exploratory models 
Model χ2 df RMSEA CFI SRMR 
Common cause1 < 0.001  22 0.033 [0.028, 0.040] 0.988 0.021 
Common cause2 <0.001 18 0.027 [0.021, 0.033] 0.992 0.015 
Dynamic mutualism3  < 0.001 6 0.019 [0.004, 0.034] 0.999 0.006 
Note: 1 = Common model with residual change score covariance over time. 2= Common 
cause model with residual change score covariance over time and direct age effects on 
change. 3 = Dynamic mutualism model with age directly influencing change scores and 
coupling parameters constrained to equality to over-identify model. 
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Appendix C – Preregistration and supplementary information 
Supplement 1. We examined the developmental p-factor that arises from a higher-order factor 
model and not the p-factor that arises from bifactor model. Our rationale is twofold. First, 
several concerns have been voiced regarding the use of bifactor models. These include 
concerns about the theoretical interpretability of specific factors (Bonifay, Lane, & Reise, 
2017) and a propensity to overfit data, which urges caution when interpreting model fit indices 
(Murray & Johnson, 2013; Morgan et al., 2015). Second, it is not possible to estimate a dynamic 
mutualism model that can be used for comparison with a bifactor model. In a bifactor model 
the p-factor directly explains a large component of the shared variance between all symptoms. 
A competing dynamic mutualism model needs to explain this shared variance through the 
causal interrelations between all symptoms. This needs more regression parameters than are 
possible to estimate with the degrees of freedom we have available. In a higher-order factor 
model, the p-factor explains the shared variance between specific factors. A competing 
dynamic mutualism model needs to explain this shared variance through the causal 
interrelations between specific factors (not symptoms). This is possible. Directly comparing a 
dynamic mutualism model that specifies causal interrelations between specific factors with a 
bifactor common cause model, would be like comparing two different explanations for two 
different phenomena. As the bifactor model would explain the correlations between symptoms 
via a causal p-factor, while the dynamic mutualism model would explain the correlations 
between specific factors via the causal interrelations between them. Hence, we will directly 
compare the higher-order factor model with the (only possible) dynamic mutualism model, 
because they provide different explanations for the same phenomenon. 
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Table C1 
Deviations from preregistration 
Dataset Planned to Deviation Rationale 
SHARE Use four symptom items as 
indicators. 
Used item parcels as 
indicators. 
To normalize data for 
maximum likelihood 
estimation. 
 Use data from all persons in 
sample. 
Used only the persons 
that had at least 1 
measurement on the 
EURO-D scale across 
all waves. 
We wanted to assess 
developmental changes 
over time and most 
cases only had data on 
one wave. This would 
have resulted in more 
than 70 percent missing 
data. Hence, only 
analyzing a subset of 
this data was deemed 
most defensible. 
z-proso We reported that the sample 
size for the 4 waves used was 
1532. 
The actual sample size 
was 1482. 
— 
 Use a four-factor EFA to 
identify item content of 
factors. 
We specified the item 
content of the four 
factors based on theory. 
The four-factor EFA 
showed a divergent 
optimal structure 
throughout the four 
waves. To specify a 
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homogeneous factor 
model that is most 
generalizable, we relied 
on the conceptual 
congruence of the items 
instead. 
 
